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The Oddity and Odyssey of "Presumed Damages"
in Defamation Actions Under Pennsylvania Law
Kevin P. Allen*
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1974, the United States Supreme Court described defamation
as an "oddity of tort law" because of the concept of "presumed
damages," which permitted defamation plaintiffs to recover damages even if they could not prove that they actually suffered any
harm.' In that landmark decision, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the
Supreme Court decided that, at least in certain circumstances, the
oddity of presumed damages could no longer co-exist with First
Amendment freedom of speech rights.!
Nearly thirty years later, Pennsylvania law's treatment of "presumed damages" in defamation actions is still unsettled. This article traces the odyssey in Pennsylvania of this oddity of tort law
from a nineteenth century statute, to the early twentieth century
when presumed damages were available whenever a plaintiff
could prove the publication of a libelous or slanderous per se
statement, to the 1960's and 1970's when the United States Supreme Court, in Gertz and other decisions, limited, on constitutional grounds, the availability of presumed damages, to today
which finds the continued availability of presumed damages to be
in serious doubt under Pennsylvania law.

II. BEFORE GERTZ, PRESUMED DAMAGES WERE AVAILABLE
For decades prior to Gertz, presumed damages were unquestionably available to libel and slander per se plaintiffs under
Pennsylvania law.' As its name suggests, the concept of presumed
* The author is a partner in the Pittsburgh-based law firm of Thorp Reed & Armstrong, LLP. He received his J.D. in 1995 from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
and a B.A. in 1992 from Yale University. The author is grateful for the research assistance
provided by Marissa Savastana.
1. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
2. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
3. See Corabi v. Curtis Pub. Co., 273 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1971); Montgomery v. Dennison, 69
A.2d 520 (Pa. 1949); Will v. Press Pub. Co., 164 A. 621 (Pa. 1933); Liacopoulos v. Comoulis,
148 A- 474 (Pa. 1929); Drebin v. Jewish World Pub. Co., 105 A. 58 (Pa. 1918); Phillips v.
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damages permitted a defamation plaintiff to recover compensatory
damages without having to prove that the libelous4 or slanderous
per se5 statement caused the plaintiff any actual harm.6 The rationale for presuming damages in certain defamation actions was
that requiring proof of actual reputational harm would be unfair
because "the effect of defamatory statements is so subtle and indirect that it is impossible directly to trace the effects thereof in loss
to the person defamed."' In Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co.,' the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the "damages to be given
for libel are not susceptible of precise measurement ....
General
damages are given to compensate the plaintiff for harm for which
the defamatory statement is assumed to have caused his or her
reputation."9 Thus, at common law, once a defamation plaintiff
proved that the defendant published a libelous or slanderous per
se statement, the plaintiff could recover "for the harm which normally results from such a defamation."1" The availability of such
presumed damages in defamation actions under Pennsylvania law
was not in dispute until the United States Supreme Court and the
First Amendment intervened.
III. GERTZ AND THE SUPREME COURT'S APPARENT HOSTILITY TO
PRESUMED DAMAGES

The security of his reputation or good name from the arts of
detraction and slander, are rights to which every man is entitled by reason and naturaljustice; since without these, it is

Hoefer, 1 Pa. 62 (1845); Miller v. Hubbard, 207 A.2d 913 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965); Leppley v.
Smith, 91 Pa. Super. 117 (1927); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 621 (1938).
4. "A libel is any malicious publication, written, printed or painted... which words or
signs tends to expose a person to contempt, ridicule, hatred or degradation of character."
Neeb v. Hope, 2 A. 568, 570 (Pa. 1886).
5. "Slander is defamation by words spoken, that is speaking of base and defamation
words which tend to prejudice of reputation office, trade, business or means of getting a
living of another." Solosko v. Paxton, 119 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. 1956). Slander per se is a
publication imputing a criminal offense, a loathsome disease, business misconduct, or serious sexual misconduct. Chicarella v. Passant, 494 A.2d 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
6. See Leppley, 91 Pa.Super. at 120-21.
7. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (1938).
8. 273 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1971).
9. Corabi,273 A.2d at 919-20.
10. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 621 (1938). At common law, and today, if the
defamatory statement is not libelous or slanderous per se, the plaintiff must prove a pecuniary loss ("special harm") from the defamation. See Brinich v. Jencka, 757 A.2d 388, 397
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).

Spring 2004

Presumed Damages

497

impossible to have the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or right.1
Congress shall make no law.
speech.... "

. .

abridging the freedom of

In Gertz, the United States Supreme Court limited the availability of presumed damages in defamation actions because of concerns that such awards violated the right of freedom of speech
contained in the First Amendment to the federal Constitution.'3
Gertz was an attorney who represented a family in a civil action
against the police officer who had shot and killed a young member
of that family." Welch published an anti-Communist magazine. 5
In the magazine, Welch portrayed Gertz as a Communist who had
framed the officer.'6 Gertz sued Welch for defamation. 7
After the jury returned a verdict in Gertz's favor, the district
court entered judgment n.o.v. in favor of Welch based on the New
York Times privilege.' 8 In its 1964 New York Times decision, the
Supreme Court created a privilege that limited defamation actions
in cases where the plaintiff is a public official. 9 Because of First
Amendment concerns, the New York Times Court held that a public official could not succeed in a defamation action unless the official could prove that the publication was made with "actual malice," which the Court defined to be "with knowledge that [the defamatory statement] was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."" In a later decision, the Court extended the New York Times privilege to cases involving "public
figures.""
Gertz appealed, arguing that he was a private person and,
therefore, that Welch was not entitled to the New York Times
privilege.2 2 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment in Welch's favor, concluding that, because Gertz was
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 134.
U.S. CONST. amend. 1, § 1.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50.
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
Id.
Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 330.
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involved in a matter of public interest, Welch was entitled to the
protection of the New York Times privilege. 3
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision because the Supreme Court concluded that, in cases
involving private individuals, First Amendment freedom of speech
concerns do not outweigh the state interest in protecting an individual's reputation. 4 The Court reasoned that public officials and
public figures, because of their greater access to effective channels
of communication, were better able to refute defamatory comments than private individuals, to whom effective communication
channels are not so readily available.25 The Court concluded that,
because of their greater vulnerability, private individuals should
not be required to overcome the New York Times hurdle.26
However, the Court did not remove First Amendment concerns
from the equation entirely. The Court found that the concept of
awarding presumed damages, and punitive damages, was in conflict with the First Amendment and was not justified sufficiently
by the state interest in protecting private individuals' reputations. 27 According to the Court:
States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it
allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss ....
The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability
for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of
First Amendment freedoms. . . . More to the point, the States
have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as
this petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury.
...It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not
prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth
to compensation for actual injury....
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 331-32.
Id. at 339-48.
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 346-47.
Gertz, at 348-50.
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In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by
New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.28
Gertz and New York Times became the posts and rails of a fence
that established constitutional boundaries beyond which state
defamation law could not wander. Under New York Times, states
cannot allow public officials or public figures to succeed in defamation cases without proof of actual malice. Under Gertz, the Court
signaled that, because of First Amendment concerns, states could
not award presumed damages to plaintiffs without proof of actual
malice.
Gertz, however, is proscriptive, not prescriptive.
Gertz restricted the ability of a state to award presumed damages to a
plaintiff who could not prove actual malice.29 Gertz does not, however, impose any corresponding affirmative requirement on a state
to award presumed damages if a plaintiff is able to prove that the
defendant acted with actual malice.3"
IV. AGRISS AND THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF GERTZ IN

PENNSYLVANIA
Gertz's impact on presumed damages appeared initially to have
ramifications for all defamation plaintiffs. According to the Gertz
Court, presumed damages were an "oddity" that left juries with
"uncontrolled discretion," which resulted in an unnecessary inhibition of the cherished right of freedom of speech.3 The Supreme
Court's apparent hostility to presumed damages pointed to the
conclusion that, based on the limits imposed by the First Amendment, presumed damages were no longer available to any type of
defamation plaintiff-be that plaintiff a public official, a public
figure, or, like Gertz himself, a private figure-unless that plaintiff could prove actual malice. 2
Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc.33 presented the Pennsylvania
Superior Court with the opportunity to apply that understanding
28.
29.
30.
1993);
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 349-50.
Id.
See, e.g., Walker v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, Inc., 634 A.2d 237, 243 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 468 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
Id. at 348-50.
483 A.2d 456 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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of Gertz to Pennsylvania defamation law. Agriss was a trucker
who filed a defamation claim against his employer because his
supervisors accused him of opening company mail without permission.34 The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit because, among other reasons, the court concluded that
Agriss was obligated under Gertz to prove "actual harm" and
failed to so do. 5
Although Agriss was not a public official or a public figure, and
although the case did not involve any issue of public concern, the
Superior Court agreed with the trial court that Gertz required
Agriss to prove that he had sustained actual harm.3 6 According to
the Superior Court:
[t]he requirement that a plaintiff in a defamation case prove
"actual harm" derives from the landmark case of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. .. . in which the United States Supreme
Court delineated certain significant limitations the First
Amendment imposes on defamation actions by private individuals ."
Although the Superior Court concluded that Gertz required proof
of "actual harm," the Superior Court reversed the trial court because it decided that Agriss had presented sufficient evidence of
actual harm.38 The Court specifically left open the issue of
whether presumed damages were still available under Gertz even
if a plaintiff were able to prove "actual malice."39
V. DUN & BRADSTREET - RETREATING FROM GERTZ

Less than a year after Agriss, the United States Supreme Court
clarified and limited the applicability of Gertz by holding that the
First Amendment does not restrict the ability of a state to award
presumed damages to a private plaintiff in a matter that does not
involve any issue of public concern.4" Dun & Bradstreet did not
involve a public official or public figure or, in contrast to Gertz,
any matter of public concern.41 Instead, the alleged defamation at
34. Agriss, 483 A.2d at 460.
35. Id.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 467.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Agriss, 483 A_2d at 468 n.5.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761-62.
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issue in Dun & Bradstreet involved a purely private plaintiff and a
purely private matter.42 The Supreme Court concluded that the
absence of any issue of public concern rendered the speech at issue
largely ineligible for any First Amendment protection.4 3 Without
significant First Amendment concerns, the state interest in protecting an individual's reputation predominates.' In contrast to
Gertz's hostility to presumed damages, the Dun & Bradstreet plurality rather heartily endorsed the use of presumed damages as a
means of furthering the legitimate state interest in protecting an
individual's reputation. 45 According to Justice Powell's opinion:
Courts for centuries have allowed juries to presume that some
damage occurred from many defamatory utterances and publications .... This rule furthers the state's interest in providing remedies for defamation by insuring that those remedies
are effective. In light of the reduced constitutional value of
speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that
the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed
and punitive damages - even absent a showing of actual mal46
ice.
VI. WALKER - ANOTHER REJECTION OF PRESUMED DAMAGES

In 1993, in Walker v. Grand Central Sanitation, Inc., the
Pennsylvania Superior Court retrod some of the ground covered by
Agriss but did so with the benefit of Dun & Bradstreet's clarification of Gertz." Walker involved a private plaintiff and no matter
of public concern.4 9 The plaintiff, Walker, did not provide sufficient evidence that the statements at issue caused her any actual
harm."° Therefore, Walker's ability to succeed in her claim depended on the availability of presumed damages."1
The Superior Court recognized that it had decided Agriss under
the false belief that Gertz and the First Amendment required all
defamation plaintiffs, private or public, to prove actual harm, ab42. Id.
43. Id. at 763
44. Id. at 760-61.
45. Id.
46. Id. (footnote omitted).
47. 634 A.2d 237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
48. Walker, 634 A.2d at 242-43.
49. Id. at 238-40.
50. Id. at 239-40.
51. Id. at 244-45.
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sent proof of actual malice." Based on Dun & Bradstreet, the
Walker Court acknowledged that, contrary to the holding in
Agriss, the First Amendment does not prohibit Pennsylvania from
awarding presumed damages to purely private plaintiffs.53
Although, pursuant to Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet, the First
Amendment does not prohibit states from awarding presumed
damages in a purely private plaintiff case, the First Amendment
does not mandate conversely that states provide the benefit of
presumed damages to private plaintiffs.' In purely private plaintiff cases, the New York Times/Gertz constitutional fence is not
present and states are free to decide for themselves whether to
award presumed damages or not.5 Thus, following Gertz and Dun
& Bradstreet, the Walker Court was left to decide, purely as a
matter of Pennsylvania law, whether such damages are available
to defamation plaintiffs.56
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Second Restatement") and general tort law principles, the Walker Court held
that presumed damages are not available and that, under Pennsylvania law, "a defendant who publishes a statement which can
be slander per se is liable for the proven actual harm the publication causes."57 The Second Restatement abandons the First Restatement's endorsement of presumed damages." Section 621 of
the Second Restatement provides that "[o]ne who is liable for a
defamatory communication is liable for the proved, actual harm
caused to the reputation of the person defamed."59 The Walker
Court held that the Second Restatement's position was consistent
with Pennsylvania's general policy in tort actions of providing
complete redress to an injured party without being unfair to the
liable party. °
Under Walker, all defamation plaintiffs in Pennsylvania are
subject to section 621 of the Second Restatement, must prove actual damages, and cannot rely on a presumption of damages."

52. Id. at 243.
53. Walker, 634 A.2d at 243.
54. See supranote 30.
55. Walker, 634 A.2d at 243.
56. Id. at 243-44.
57. Id. at 244.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 (1977).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 243-44.
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Many courts, based on Walker, have held flatly that presumed
damages are no longer available in Pennsylvania.62
VII. DESPITE WALKER, THE UNCERTAINTY CONTINUES
Although Walker appears to eliminate entirely presumed damages from Pennsylvania defamation law, Walker did not address
itself specifically to the issue that Agriss left unresolved: Are presumed damages available under Pennsylvania law to a defamation
plaintiff who is able to prove that the defendant acted with actual
malice? Walker's silence on that issue 3 has been the primary
source of the confusion that persists over presumed damages under Pennsylvania law.
The Second Restatement contributes to the uncertainty, particularly because of Walker's heavy reliance upon it. Although section
621 of the Second Restatement states that liability is predicated
on proof of actual harm, a caveat to section 621 clouds the issue.'
In the caveat, the authors of section 621 leave the door open to the
recovery of presumed damages if a plaintiff can prove actual malice.65 The caveat provides:

62. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Zurawin, 52 Fed. Appx. 570, 579 (3d Cir. Oct. 11, 2002) ("Pennsylvania law requires a plaintiff in a defamation action to prove . .. 'actual harm' . . .");
KNK Med.-Dental Specialties, Ltd. v. Tamex Corp., Nos. Civ. A. 99-3409, 99-5265, 2000 WL
1470665, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2000) ("Even though plaintiff does not have to show
special damages, they [sic] still must make a showing of general damages, i.e., reputational
harm."); SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554, 565 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd, 259 F.3d 717 (3d
Cir. 2001); Synygy, Inc. v. Scott-Levin, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 570, 581-82 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
("plaintiff must show general damages where the alleged defamation is per se"), affd, 229
F.3d 1139 (3d Cir. 2000); Mediaworks, Inc. v. Lasky, No. Civ. A. 99-1290, 1999 WL 695585,
at *9 (E.D. Pa. August 26, 1999)("in order to recover in a defamation per se action the plaintiff must show general damages") (internal quotation marks omitted); Protocomm Corp. v.
Fluent, Inc., Civ. A. No. 93-0518, 1994 WL 719674, at *11 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ('a complainant
who pleads slander per se ... must prove general damages. . ."); Brinich, 757 A.2d at 397
(following Second Restatement § 621's "actual harm" requirement); Sylk v. Bernsten, No.
1906 Jan. Term 2002, 2003 WL 1848565, at *9 (Pa. Com. P1. Feb. 4, 2003); Jackson v. Robhn
& Haas Co., 56 Pa. D. & C. 4th 449, 467 (Phila. Co. 2002); Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v.
Asenio, No. 3970 July Term 2000, 2002 WL 31387765, at *6 (Pa. Com. P1. Oct. 22, 2002);
Bochetto v. Gibson, No. 3722 Apr. Term 2000, 2002 WL 434551, at *9 (Pa. Com. Pl. March
13, 2002); McGovern v. Chilson, 47 Pa. D. & C. 4th 449, 452 (Bradford Co. 2000) ("in an
ordinary defamation matter Pennsylvania does not recognize presumed damages . . .");
Haltzman v. Brill, 29 Pa. D. & C. 4th 356, 364 (Chester Co. 1995) ("Based on Walker... the
current rule is that a plaintiff cannot recover on a defamation action unless he can prove
actual harm.").
63. This is the same question that Agriss expressly left unresolved. See 483 A.2d at
468 n.5.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 caveat.
65.

Id.
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The Institute takes no position on whether the traditional
common law rule allowing recovery in the absence of proof of
actual harm, for the harm that normally results from such a
defamation, may constitutionally be applied if the defendants
knew of the falsity of the communication or acted in reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity.66
With that door left open, some authorities, despite Walker, continue to indicate that presumed damages remain available under
Pennsylvania law to plaintiffs who prove actual malice." In Beverly Enterprises, the Third Circuit, in a footnote and without any
acknowledgement of Walker, stated that "[u]nder Pennsylvania
law, where a defendant acts with actual malice, there is no need to
prove actual damages. " 68 Pennsylvania's Suggested Standard
Civil Jury Instructions, relying still on the First Restatement and
Corabi, also provide for an award of presumed damages if the
plaintiff proves actual malice.69 A panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in an unreported opinion,
has questioned, based on Walker, whether that instruction is still
appropriate. °
VIII. FORGOTTEN STATUTE
A seldom invoked, but still-existent statute, 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 8344 (2003),71 and the history of that statute, also complicate the
66. Id.

67. See Beverly Enterprises, Inc. v. Trump, 182 F.3d 183, 189 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999); Sprague v. American Bar Ass'n, 276 F. Supp. 2d 365, 372-75 (E.D. Pa. 2003); 2 Pennsylvania
Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instruction ("Pa. SSJI") § 13.10 (Civ).
68. Beverly, 182 F.3d at 189 n.2; see also Sprague v. American Bar Ass'n, No. Civ. A.
01-382, 2001 WL 1450606, at *2 n. 6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2001) ("Damages are assumed when
there is injury to one's professional reputation ...).
69. 2 Pa. SSJI (Civ) § 13.10 ("If you find that the defendant acted [with actual malice],
you may presume that the plaintiff suffered" damages) (2d ed. 2003); see also Frisk v. News
Co., 523 A.2d 347, 353-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). In Beverly, the Third Circuit relied on
Frisk, which predates Walker, to support the proposition that presumed damages are available to plaintiffs able to prove actual malice. Beverly, 182 F.3d at 189 n.2.
70. See Paul v. Hearst Corp., No. 00-2351, slip op. (3d Cir. Dec. 27, 2001) (per curiam)
("There is some reason to believe that this instruction may no longer reflect the law of
accord Hansel v. Shell Oil Corp., 169 F.R.D. 303, 308
Pennsylvania. See Walker.... ");
(E.D. Pa. 1996) ("There is considerable doubt as to whether such a theory [presumed damages] is viable.").
71. Section 8344 provides:
In all civil actions for libel, no damages shall be recovered unless it is established to
the satisfaction of the jury, under the direction of the court as in other cases, that the
publication has been maliciously or negligently made, but where malice or negligence
appears such damages may be awarded as the jury shall deem proper."
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status of presumed damages in Pennsylvania. An examination of
the history of section 8344 requires a return to the late nineteenth
century, when the Pennsylvania Legislature, decades prior to
Gertz, mounted its own attack against presumed damages.
That attack was successful, but the success was short-lived. In
1897, the Pennsylvania Legislature decided to eliminate presumed
damages from Pennsylvania law. In a succinct and complete repudiation of presumed damages, section 3 of Act No. 168 of 1897
provided that "[i]n no civil actions for libel shall damages be
awarded beyond just restitution for injury actually sustained."72
In Goebeler v. Wilhelm, 73 a 1901 decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized that section 3 of the 1897 Act limited libel
plaintiffs to compensation for actual injury.74
However, just two days after Goebeler, and four years after it
limited recovery in defamation cases to compensation "for injury
actually sustained," the Pennsylvania Legislature amended the
libel statue, and, in so doing, appears to have intended specifically
to restore presumed damages to Pennsylvania law. Section 3 of
Act No. 44 of 1901 provided that:
[i]n all civil actions for libel, no damages shall be recovered
unless it is established to the satisfaction of the jury that the
publication has been maliciously or negligently made, but
where malice or negligence appears such damages may be
awarded as the jury shall deem proper."
Thus, with section 3 of the 1901 Act, the Legislature decided to
remove the "actual injury" requirement contained in section 3 of
the 1897 Act and instead provided juries with the discretion to
award whatever damages they deemed proper if a plaintiff proved
a malicious or negligent publication - a formulation consistent
with "presumed damages."7 6
The provisions of section 3 of the 1901 Act, which manifested an
apparent desire of the Legislature to make presumed damages
again available to defamation plaintiffs, remain in force today.
Section 8344 is a verbatim reenactment of section 3 of the 1901

PA. CONS. STAT. § 8344 (2003).

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

1897 Pa. Laws 168.
17 Pa. Super. 432 (1901).
Goebeler, 17 Pa. Super. at 432; see also Stroud v. Smith, 45 A. 329 (Pa. 1900).
1901 Pa. Laws 44.
See id.
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Act.77 Thus, in 1976, when it enacted section 8344, the Legislature, knowingly or unknowingly, 8 chose to reaffirm the statute
that made presumed damages available to Pennsylvania defamation plaintiffs.
IX. THE PROPER RESOLUTION
The ultimate fate of presumed damages in Pennsylvania requires an analytical resegregation of state defamation law from
First Amendment constitutional principles. Prior to New York
Times and Gertz, defamation was purely a matter of state law.79
The concept of "actual malice" is a principle that the United States
Supreme Court introduced and developed in New York Times,
Gertz, and other decisions, to set constitutional boundaries for
state defamation law in order to protect freedom of speech. Inside
those boundaries, or in cases where no constitutional limits apply,
states remain free to operate as they see fit.8" Thus, if a state, on
its own, decided to impose limitations on defamation plaintiffs
more stringent than those required by New York Times and Gertz,
and thereby broaden freedom of speech, that state is free to do so.8 '
Inside the constitutional fence, or in cases where the fence is not
in place, the First Amendment plays no role and, accordingly, the
constitutional concept of "actual malice" is inapplicable.
When it decided Walker, a case involving a private plaintiff and
no issue of public concern, the Pennsylvania Superior Court was
operating free from any First Amendment limitations.8 2 Thus,
Walker is purely a pronouncement of state defamation law.
Walker makes no distinction between plaintiffs who are able to
prove New York Times-style actual malice and those who cannot;
nor does Walker make any distinction between plaintiffs who are
public officials, public figures, private persons involved in matters
of public concern, or purely private plaintiffs.8 3 Walker makes no
material reference to those constitutional distinctions because the
Walker Court had no reason to concern itself with constitutional
77. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 8344, Historical and Statutory Notes; see also 12 P.S. § 1583 (repealed) (Purdon's 1953).
78. The legislative history of section 8344 sheds no light on the issue. S.B. 935, 1976
Legis. Sess., Rep. Comm. Conf.; 1976 Legis. J.-H.R. at 5863-65 (Pa. June 29, 1976).
79.

See Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 755; Agriss, 483 A.2d at 467.

80. See Walker, 634 A.2d at 243.
81.
82.

See id.
Id.

83.

Id. at 244.
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issues. The classification of plaintiffs and the presence or absence
of actual malice are all constitutional concepts that come into play
only when state law brushes up against the boundaries established under the First Amendment. The Superior Court decided
Walker in a realm governed exclusively by state law.
Walker, which must therefore be understood as a pure pronouncement of state law, stands for the proposition that Pennsylvania law no longer provides any defamation plaintiffs with the
potential windfall of presumed damages.' Instead, according to
Walker, defamation plaintiffs should be on par with all other tort
plaintiffs in Pennsylvania.85 Recovery of damages should only be
available to those plaintiffs who are able to prove that a defendant's wrongful conduct actually caused some harm. Walker provides for no exception to that general rule of Pennsylvania state
law, and there is no reason to muddy Walker's waters with inapplicable constitutional standards like "actual malice." Under
Walker, all defamations plaintiffs, including those who can and
those who cannot prove actual malice, must, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, prove that they have suffered actual harm from the
defamatory publication.8 6
That broad reading of Walker is sensible and appropriate, in addition to being accurate, because requiring proof of actual harm
does not place an insurmountable obstacle in the path of defamation plaintiffs. "Actual harm" requires "proof that one's reputation
was actually affected by the slander, or that [the plaintiff] suffered
personal humiliation, or both."7 Based on that definition of actual
harm, courts have permitted plaintiffs who presented only minimal evidence of actual harm to submit their claims to a jury and
recover damages. For instance, in Brinich, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff whose evidence of actual harm included only his testimony that he was
"momentarily angered" by the defendant's suggestion that the
plaintiff used drugs, and the testimony of a witness who heard the
accusation, did not believe the plaintiff used drugs, but merely
"considered the possibility."88 Thus, the underlying rationale for
84. Id.
85. Walker, 634 A.2d at 243.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 242; accordBrinich, 757 A.2d at 397.
88. Brinich, 757 A.2d at 397-98; accord Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men,
754 F.2d 1072, 1080 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiffs testimony that he was "frustrated, distraught, upset, and distressed" about the defamation, while not overwhelming,
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the concept of presumed damages-that the harm generated by a
defamatory publication is not susceptible to proof and that requiring such proof from defamation plaintiffs would be unreasonableis not well-founded. The evidentiary bar for proving damages is
already sufficiently low for defamation plaintiffs 89; there is no
need to remove it entirely by providing the further luxury of a presumption of damages. The Walker Court correctly concluded that
a defamation plaintiff, like all other tort plaintiffs, must produce
evidence that the defendant's wrongful conduct actually caused
the plaintiff some harm. 90
Accordingly, Walker, as a pronouncement of state law, establishes that, in Pennsylvania, defamation plaintiffs-all defamation
plaintiffs-must produce evidence of actual harm in order to recover damages.9 ' Consequently, pursuant to Walker, and in accordance with the Second Restatement, 9 the oddity of awarding presumed damages to a plaintiff who cannot prove any actual harm
should come to a conclusive end in Pennsylvania.
X. CONCLUSION

Presumed damages are resilient. The United States Supreme
Court, the Second Restatement, the Pennsylvania Legislature,
and the Pennsylvania Superior Court have all taken steps, at one
time or another, in the direction of eliminating presumed damages
from defamation law. Nevertheless, because the full breadth and
implications of Walker have yet to take firm hold, because of the
caveat to section 621 of the Second Restatement, and, potentially,
because of the provisions and history of section 8344, defamation
plaintiffs who are able to prove actual malice still have some bases
for claiming entitlement to a presumption of damages. Until the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Legislature, or,
was sufficient proof of actual harm); see also PPG,52 Fed. Appx. at 578-80; Agriss, 483 A.2d
at 467.
89. See Sprague, 276 F. Supp. at 374-75.
90. See Walker, 634 A.2d at 244.
91. Id.; accord Burcham v. Murphy, 961 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Ark. 1998) (citing Walker as
abolishing the doctrine of presumed damages); but see Sprague, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 374
(despite trend away from presumed damages and legitimate policy reasons for that trend,
'such damages are probably still available to defamation plaintiffs").
92. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has a "tendency to adopt the Second Restatement
of Torts in defamation matters." Walker, 634 A.2d at 244; accord Agriss, 483 A.2d at 473;
see also Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc. 327 A.2d 94, 100 n.25 (Pa. 1974) ("In recent years, this
Court has not hesitated to adopt sections of the [Second Restatement] when our commonlaw precedents varied from the Restatement or when the Pennsylvania common law provided no answer.").
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possibly, the United States Supreme Court removes this uncertainty, the odyssey of this oddity of defamation law will likely continue in Pennsylvania.

